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A common problem with educational interventions is that they 
require the collection of data across one or many school years before an 
assessment of their effectiveness can be performed. This paper describes the 
selection task, and makes the case for its use in evaluating the effectiveness 
of educational interventions. As an example, a study is described that uses 
the selection task to determine the degree to which student performance is 
positively influenced by knowledge of success criteria. Further, this study 
examined whether the impact of knowledge of this success criteria is 
inhibited or augmented by the magnitude of the success criteria provided. 
Participants were given success criteria of 10/10, 8/10, 6/10, 4/10, or nothing 
(control). Performance on the task was greatest when success criteria were 
provided, but only when the success criteria were not too strict. Implications 
for educational practice are discussed.  
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Introduction 
The specific aim of the present study is to address whether or not 
providing knowledge of criteria facilitates success on an academic task. In 
addition, this study will seek to replicate findings on the differential 
difficulties between two types of problems on a commonly used measure of 
deductive reasoning. The impact of teacher expectations on student 
performance has strong research support. As students perceive higher 
expectations from their teachers and/or parents, academic performance tends 
to increase. (Babad, 1998; Brophy, 1983; Cooper, 1985; Feldman and 
Thiess, 1982; Good and Weinstein, 1986; Haynes, Tikly, and Caballero, 
2006; Rubie-Davies, 2006; Rubie-Davies, 2007; Rubie-Davies, Peterson, 
Irving, Widdowson, and Dixon, 2010; Weinstein, 2002) 
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However, these studies have focused on increasing teacher 
expectations among student populations who had previously perceived 
teacher expectations to be significantly lower. If expectations are too high, 
students may be inclined to decrease effort in order to avoid failure. (Grant 
and Dweck, 2003; Hong, Chiu, Dweck, Lin and Wan, 1999; McWhirter, 
Torres, Salgado, and Valdez, 2007; Plaks, Grant and Dweck, 2005).  
According to the attribution theory developed by Bernard Wiener 
(1980, 1982), motivation is somewhat like a cost-benefit analysis that weighs 
effort and risk against the expectations for success. Working hard and doing 
well can provide a real joy and pride, but one may not feel like the odds of 
this happening are worth the risk. If one really tries, and he or she do not 
succeed, then he or she is almost forced to conclude that one is what one 
fears – stupid. Putting forth little or no effort offers one the opportunity to 
brush off a failure by attributing the failure, not to one’s lack of ability, but 
rather to one’s lack of effort. Over time, students who have tried and failed 
may exhibit an educational form of learned helplessness, where failures are 
expected and successes are attributed to external causes (such as luck). 
(Dweck, 1975) 
When a student is given specific guidance, such as a rubric, which 
clarifies criteria for grading success, the result can be an improvement in 
performance. Some studies indicate that rubrics clarify expectations, and 
make grading standards more comprehensible (Bissell and Lemons, 2006; 
Dahm et al., 2004; Frederiksen and Collins, 1989). There is, however, a 
dearth of literature on the actual effectiveness of rubric use on student’s 
academic performance. Rubrics distinctively set standards for achievement; 
they also provide a specific way to grade work and provide students with 
helpful feedback they can later revise. Rubrics can possibly make 
expectations clearer to students, especially when a rubric is used as a guide 
while completing an assessment (Allen and Tanner, 2006; Arter and 
McTighe, 2001; Dochy, Gijbels, and Segers, 2006; Perlman, 2003). It seems 
that students are asking for guidance and a clear vision of what the teacher 
desires, helping them to better understand the goals for their project. When a 
professor uses rubrics to outline what information they want answered, 
students can easily narrow down and eliminate other information to perform 
better on an assessment.  
In one experiment (Howell, 2011), the control group who completed 
a course assignment without a grading rubric, scored, on average, 
considerably lower, than the treatment group, who completed the same 
assignment, but was provided with a grading rubric. This research supports 
the idea that students who are provided with a grading rubric, as compared to 
their colleagues who are not given a rubric, perform better on an assignment 
(see also Moskal, 2000).  The use of rubrics as an instructional tool goes 




hand and hand with the clarity of a student’s expectations and the student’s 
ability to set realistic goals to achieve. Researchers argue that rubrics are 
beneficial to a students’ peer and self-assessment (Goodrich, 1997). In this 
case a student is more motivated and confident in the work they have done 
when guided by the rubric. Students learn more on a concept when using the 
rubric as a guide (Andrade, 2000).  
Not only can rubrics point out the strengths and weaknesses of 
student writing skills, they provide an outline of information needed so 
students can directly absorb the information needed for the assessment. A 
study by Andrade and Saddler (2004) concluded that if a category on a rubric 
was sentence structure, and students were encouraged to begin sentences in 
different ways, a student could assess his or her sentences based on the rubric 
and revise the sentences to meet the standards specified. Additionally, 
rubrics save time for teachers with multiple classes and students. Instead of 
commenting on every assignment due, the professor now can point out what 
is directly missing from the assignment on the rubric. A clear rubric can help 
students understand any distinctions or alignments between what was 
submitted and what the professor wanted. This information can then be used 
to improve the quality of work on future submissions.  
In addition to providing information about criteria, it is also important 
that the criteria be within the means of each student. An academic task with 
criteria that is far above a students’ level of competence will be ineffective. 
Vygotsky’s concept of scaffolding suggests that knowledge must be 
appropriate for the child’s level of comprehension (Eddy, 2010). In his zone 
of proximal development (ZPD) theory there are two levels of attainment for 
the ZPD: Level 1 represents the ‘present level of development’. This 
describes what the child is capable of doing without any help from others. 
Level 2 represents the ‘potential level of development’. This refers to what 
the child could potentially be capable of demonstrating with help from other 
people or ‘teachers’. However, anything that is too complicated for the child 
to learn that isn’t in their ZPD cannot be learned at all until there is a shift in 
the ZPD. When a child does attain their potential, this shift occurs and the 
child can continue learning more complex, higher level material.  
Therefore, if the expectations for a student are realistic and 
reasonable, then an academic goal becomes achievable and more likely to be 
accomplished. According to Huba and Freed, (2000) a necessary feature for 
measuring student learning outcomes is to set benchmarks for successful 
student, course, program, or degree outcomes, including milestones to 
gradually move from current performance levels to the benchmark goal. This 
suggestion is in alignment with Vygotsky’s theory of proximal development 
and is the guiding theory of the present study.  
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Two previously studied areas of research on the development of 
reasoning constitute the background for the construction of the present study.  
The first area is in the field of deductive reasoning, which particularly 
questions the role of logic versus the role of semantic content in determining 
performance on reasoning problems. One theoretical approach (O’Brien and 
Overton, 1982; Byrnes and Overton, 1986; Overton, 1990; Overton, 2010) 
maintains that the development of a logical competence is a necessary 
prerequisite for solutions to deductive reasoning problems. According to this 
approach, specific content effects operate as moderators of logical 
competence to inhibit or enhance successful task performance. From this 
perspective, both formal reasoning processes and the real-time information-
processing strategies related to content effects play essential roles in 
determining task performance. A second theoretical approach (e.g., 
pragmatic schemas approach of Cheng and Holyoak, 1985; mental models 
approaches of Johnson-Laird, 2006 and Markovits and Barrouillet, 2002; 
metacognitive approaches of Kuhn and Franklin, 2006 and Moshman, 2004) 
asserts that formal reasoning processes play little or no role in task 
performance. According to this approach, task performance is virtually 
totally determined by context variables such as those provided by specific 
semantic contents. 
This study sought to explore both the role of the development of 
formal logical reasoning and the role of knowledge of success criteria in the 
solution of deductive reasoning problems. The development of formal logical 
reasoning was represented in Piaget's theory (Inhelder and Piaget, 1958) as a 
succession of increasingly powerful logical systems or competencies. 
Several studies (Byrnes and Overton, 1986; O'Brien and Overton, 1982; 
Overton, Byrnes, and O'Brien, 1985) have supported the prediction that a 
fully developed formal logical competence is not available before 
adolescence. These studies, which focused specifically on conditional 
inferences, were not, however, solely concerned with the acquisition of 
logical competence. In addition, the research explored several factors, 
including task interpretation, cognitive style, and semantic content, as 
moderators of the logical competence once that competence had been 
acquired. This research is also framed by the “Dual systems Competence < -- 
> Procedural processing” approach (Ricco and Overton, 2011).  
This dual systems approach is a formulation, within a developmental 
perspective, of an integration of stage-structure (levels of competence) and 
information-processing (moderators) views of cognition. This approach 
maintains that performance on any cognitive task is a function of both level 
of logical competence and the individual's information-processing skills and 
capabilities. With respect to the present research, the main feature of this 
approach is that it distinguishes between the logical knowledge necessary for 




task solution (which individuals may or may not have available) and 
procedural informational processes (e.g., attention, encoding, representation, 
retrieval) that may facilitate or inhibit the accessibility of available logical 
knowledge.  
Wason's (1966, 1983) selection task provides an appropriate domain 
for exploring issues concerning levels of logical reasoning competence and 
the effect of semantic content as the latter is mediated through informational 
processes. The standard, or abstract, form of this task presents participants 
with an array of four cards showing, for example, respectively, the letter E, 
the letter K, the number 4, and the number 7. In addition, participants are 
presented with a conditional rule: "If there is a vowel on one side of the card, 
then there is an even number on the other side." Participants are told that 
each card has a letter on one side and a number on the other and that the task 
is to select those cards and only those cards that would have to be turned 
over to decide with certainty whether the rule is true or false. A fully 
adequate solution consists of the selection of the E and the 7 card and only 
these cards. This solution recognizes that only a falsification strategy will 
provide logical certainty. The four showing cards may be described as the E 
= p, K = ~p (not p), 4 ~ q, the 7 - ~q (not q). The conditional rule "If p then 
q" is determined with certainty only under the condition in which it is 
falsified, that is, the p \ not q selection. Only the E card (p, possible not q on 
the opposite side) and the 7 card (not q, possible p on the opposite side) 
could together satisfy this condition. 
A more common measure used for investigating developmental 
progressions in deductive reasoning is the adapted version of the selection 
task, which couches the conditional rule in more familiar, everyday scenarios 
(e.g. “If you have finished your homework, then you can watch TV.”)  
(Overton, 1990; Muller, Overton and Reene, 2001). In the version most 
commonly used, participants are given a rule in the form of “If p, then q,” 
along with four cards representing the affirmation and negation of both “p” 
and “q.” Participants are asked to demonstrate their ability to understand the 
rule as an implication, and determine the degree to which each of the four 
cards is permissible or not permissible, given the rule. Specifically, given “If 
p, then q,” then the combination “p and q” is permitted, “p and not q” is not 
permitted, and “not p and q” and “not p and not q” are indeterminate (for a 
fuller explanation of the selection task and its use in investigations of 
deductive reasoning, see Ricco, 2010).   
Muller, Overton and Reene (2001) discovered that the selection task 
contains two types of problems.  The first is the Action-Condition (AC) 
schema, where the consequent-clause is a precondition for the action or event 
mentioned in the antecedent.  Thus, an AC problem states a relation of 
conditionality and can be translated as “Q is the necessary condition for P” 
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(see Matalon, 1962; Matalon,1990) or “P only if Q” (Thompson, 1995). The 
explicit statement of the precondition relation highlights the asymmetric 
nature of the relation between antecedent and consequent; satisfying Q is 
only a necessary, but not sufficient condition, for the occurrence of P.   
The second type of selection task problem is the Condition-Action 
(CA) schema. In this schema the particular temporal relation between 
antecedent and consequent does not suggest an asymmetric relation between 
antecedent and consequent; adults are also unlikely to rephrase an obligation 
as “P only if Q” (Thompson, 1995, Experiment 1).  Thus, CA schema 
problems require the construction of an asymmetric relation between 
antecedent and consequent by negating the consequent and reversing the 
direction of the if-then sentence (“if P then Q; but not all Q are P’).  Because 
the construction of an asymmetrical relation between antecedent and 
consequent involves complex operations and is cognitively demanding 
(Staudenmayer and Bourne, 1977), the P and Q cards are frequently selected 
in those selection problems (e.g., halls and school suspension) that do not 
make the asymmetric nature of the relation explicit. Muller, Overton and 
Reene (2001) found that CA schema problems are more difficult that AC 
schema problems. The purpose of this study was to replicate this analysis of 
selection task responses with a new sample and to examine the differential 
effect of the experimental manipulation on AC/CA schema problem success. 
The ability to produce alternate antecedents that are meaningfully 
related to the consequent has been identified as a prerequisite for the correct 
solution to the Affirmation of the Consequent invalid argument form 
(Markovits, 1993).  In the selection task, this solution entails not choosing 
the Q card.  For example, to not choose the Q card in the drinking age 
problem, alternate antecedents (e.g., drinking Coke) must be generated and 
related to the consequent.  Two explanations single out specific factors 
related to the production of alternate antecedents which account for the 
relative ease of choosing the Q card in AC problems as compared to CA 
problems.  According to the first explanation (Barouillet and Lecas, 1998), 
the production of alternate antecedents is more difficult when the term in the 
consequent of the rule is binary (e.g., punished vs. not punished).  This is 
based on the assumption that the initial representation of the conditional rule 
“P then Q” consists of the construction of a mental model that establishes a 
directional relation between P and Q.  A binary consequent, thus, links P 
(e.g., running in the school halls) and Q (e.g., punished) and alternate 
instances of P (e.g., walking in the school halls) with not-Q (e.g., not 
punished).  Accordingly, alternative instances of P are not linked to Q, which 
in the selection task would result in the selection of the Q card (i.e., the 
invalid form, Affirmation of Consequent).  When the consequent is 
nonbinary, however, P is not linked to any determinate value of Q.  As a 




consequence, links between alternative cases of P and Q (e.g., drinking Coke 
and being over 21 years of age) become possible, provided working memory 
allows the construction of more complex alternate models (for a detailed 
discussion, see Barouillet and Lecas, 1998; for evidence of developmental 
progressions in the use of argument forms, see Overton, Ward, Noveck, 
Black and O’Brien, 1987, Chappell and Overton, 1998, and Rich, Fullard, 
and Overton, 2011).  
A second explanation for the relative ease of not choosing the Q card 
in AC as compared to CA problems, concerns the semantic relation between 
antecedent and consequent.  A major problem in solving conditional 
reasoning problems consists of the ability to realize that an asymmetric 
relation holds between antecedent and consequent (i.e, if P then Q, but if Q 
then not necessarily P; see Staudenmayer and Bourne, 1977). Given the 
performance-competence distinction frequently discussed by researchers in 
this area, and given the theoretical underpinning of this study – that is, that 
college-aged students have the competence to correctly solve deductive 
reasoning problems, but do not always express this competence – another 
aim of this experiment is to continue attempts to facilitate success on the 
selection task through the examination of an independent variable 
hypothesized to increase student potential. 
It is believed that these theories and findings about expectations can 
be applied to students’ own self-motivations to achieve. In particular, the 
goal is to investigate whether knowledge of success criteria can improve or 
inhibit performance on a deductive reasoning task. Success on the selection 
task has been traditionally defined as a correct falsification on 6 out of 10 of 
the problems. In one of the criteria conditions, participants will be told that 6 
out of 10 is the goal for successfully solving the task. It is believed that 
knowing that there is room for error, but also having a specific, realistic goal, 
will motivate students to try to solve the problems to a greater degree than in 
the control condition (no criteria provided), the low criteria condition (4 out 
of 10) or the high criteria conditions (8 out of 10 and 10 out of 10). In the 
low criteria condition, a hypothesis was made, favoring decreased rates of 
success, consistent with research on the dampening impact of low 
expectations discussed in the research above. In the high criteria conditions, 
it was expected for student performance to decrease in order to avoid 
possible failure, consistent with the findings of attribution theorists. 
Therefore, the general pattern of results which were expected is an inverted 
U-shaped pattern, with the highest rates of success in the 6 out of 10 
(realistic) condition, and lower rates of success for the other conditions. 
 
I 
This study investigated the impact of progressively increasing criteria 
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on deductive reasoning performance through the random assignment of one 
hundred fifty-nine African American participants (87 female, 72 male) to 
one of five conditions; namely, knowledge of different success criteria 
(control 4 out of 10, 6 out of 10, 8 out of 10, and 10 out of 10). The study 
used students from a sophomore-level psychology class that was limited to 
psychology majors. 
Participants met in a large lecture hall, where they were seated far 
enough apart to not be able to view the information/paperwork of the 
participants on either side. Students were offered extra credit for their 
participation. All student responses were confidentially recorded. 
 
Instrument and Procedure 
Each participant received a test booklet. Test booklets contained an 
instruction page and ten selection task problems (“If P then Q”), each of 
which was presented on a separate page. The ten selection task problems are 
presented in Table 1; the problems are identical to those used in a study by 
Ward and Overton (1990) and Rich, Fullard, and Overton (2011). Six 
problems (drinking age, motor vehicle, homework, handgun, permission, and 
AIDS) were AC schemas in which the consequent specifies a precondition 
that must be met if the action specified in the antecedent is to be taken. Three 
problems (halls, school suspension, and murder) were CA schemas in which 
the consequent specifies an action that must be taken when the condition 
specified in the antecedent occur. The status of the tenth problem (retired) 
was more ambiguous because the antecedent “If a person is retired from 
work” can be interpreted as either specifying a precondition (i.e., given a 
person is retired, then the person is older than 55 years of age) or a 
consequence (i.e., given a person is over 55 years of age, then the person is 
retired) of the consequent clause “then the person is over 55.” The 
instruction page informed the participant that the booklet contained several 
problems and that each presented a rule. Participants were further informed 
that for each problem, they were to determine whether the rule was being 
broken. The experimenter read aloud the instructions while the participant 
read along silently. Using a practice problem about a public swimming pool 
as an example, the format of each page was as follows: At the top of each 
page were four response alternatives presented in rectangular boxes. Two of 
the response alternatives referred to the antecedent (the “if clause”), and two 
referred to the consequent (“then clause”) of the conditional rule. Two cards 
negated either the antecedent (not-P; i.e., sunbathing) or consequent (not-Q; 
i.e., no lifeguard), and two cards affirmed the antecedent (P; i.e., swimming) 
or consequent (Q; i.e., lifeguard). Below these alternatives were the 
following instructions: 
Each of the above cards has information about four different 




people at the public pool. On one side of each card shows the person’s 
behavior at the pool. One side of the card shows whether or not a 
lifeguard is present. Remember, you can only see one side of each 
card. Here is a rule: “IF A PERSON IS SWIMMING IN THE 
PUBLIC POOL, THEN A LIFEGUARD IS PRESENT”. Select the 
card or cards that you would definitely need to turn over to decide 
whether or not the rule is being broken.  
Table 1.  Selection Task Problems 
1. If a person is drinking beer, then the person must be over 21  
Cards: P = drinking beer; not-P = drinking Coke, Q = 22 years of age, not-Q = 16 years 
of age  
2. If a student is watching television, then the student’s homework is finished 
Cards: P = watching television; not-P = not watching television; Q = homework 
finished; not-Q = homework not finished  
3. If a person is driving a motor vehicle, then the person must be over 16 years of age 
Cards: P = driving, not-P = not driving; Q = 18 years of age; not-Q = 14 years of age 
4. If a student is caught running in the school halls, then the student must be punished 
Cards: P = running in school halls; not-P = not running; Q = punished; not-Q = not 
punished  
5. If a student strikes a teacher in school, then the student is suspended from school 
Cards: P = striking teacher; not-P = not striking teacher; Q = suspended; not-Q = not 
suspended 
6. If a person has a handgun, then the handgun must be registered 
Cards: P = handgun; not-P = knife; Q = registered; not-Q = not registered 
7. If a girl under 14 years old has an abortion, then she must have permission from her 
parents 
Cards: P = 12 years of age; not-P = 16 years of age; Q = permission; not-Q = no 
permission 
8. If a child with AIDS attends school, then that child has received approval from the 
community 
Cards: P = AIDS; not-P = sore throat; Q = approval; not-Q = no approval 
9. If a drunken driver kills someone, then the driver must be charged with murder 
Cards: P = drunk; not-P = not drunk; Q = charged with murder; not-Q = not charged 
with murder 
10. If a person is retired from work, then the person must be over 55 years of age 
Cards: P = retired; not-P = not retired; Q = 60 years of age; not-Q = 40 years of age 
 
Space was provided below the boxes for the participant to mark his or 
her choice (or choices). The order of response alternatives was randomized 
across problems, and the problem order was randomized across participants. 
 
Scoring 
The logically correct answer for each problem consists of selecting 
the cards P and not-Q and not selecting the cards not-P and Q. The reason 
for this, as stated earlier, is that the P card and the not -Q cards, and only 
these two cards, could possibly each yield P and not-Q falsification 
instances. This selection combination, termed the complete falsification 
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solution was awarded a score of 1. If this was not the response pattern given 
to a problem, a score of 0 was awarded. Performance on different argument 
forms (Modus Ponens, Denial of Antecedent, Affirmation of Consequent, 
and Modus Tollens) was scored separately. Correct answers to each 
argument form were awarded a score of 1, and incorrect answers were 
awarded a score of 0. The correct answer to Modus Ponens consists of 
selecting the P card, the correct answer to Denial of Antecedent consists of 
not selecting the not-P card, the correct answer to Affirmation of Consequent 
consists of not selecting the Q card, and the correct answer to Modus Tollens 
consists of selecting the not-Q card. For example, a participant who selected 
the cards P and Q would be awarded scores of 1 for the argument forms 
Modus Ponens and Denial of Antecedent, and scores of 0 for the argument 
forms Affirmation of Consequent and Modus Tollens. Finally, each problem 
was scored for the specific combinations of response alternatives selected by 
the participants. There were 16 possible selection combinations that could be 
given on each problem. One-way ANOVAs were calculated to examine the 




The percent of participants who answered each problem with 
complete falsification was first analyzed.  These percentages were divided 
into AC and CA problems, consistent with Muller, Overton and Reene 
(2001). Inspection of table 2 indicates that the AC problems were easier than 
CA problems and that the ambiguous reasoning (retired) problem was easier 
than AC problems but more difficult than CA problems.  Because there was 
interest in comparing performance on clear AC and CA problems, the 
ambiguous problem was dropped from further analysis.  
Problem % of People had Problem Correct 
 AC CA 
Drinking 89.3%  
Homework 70.4%  
Driving 84.9%  
Halls  28.3% 
Retired 51.6%  
Suspended  34.0% 
Handgun 74.8%  
Permission 76.7%  
AIDS 73.0%  
Murder  34.0% 
Average 76.2% (not including retired problem) 32.1% 
 




In a second set of analyses, three dependent variables were assessed: 
1.  For the first dependent variable each of the 9 (the retired problem 
was excluded) problems could receive a score ranging from 0-4 (1 
point each for choosing the p card, choosing the not q card, not 
choosing the not p card, and not choosing the q card.  This yielded a 
potential range of scores of 0-36 for each participant. A one-way 
ANOVA, testing for significant differences between the control 
group and each of the four criteria groups, found a significant main 
effect: F (4,154) = 4.860, p = .001. Posthoc analyses revealed that 
scores for the control group (M 27.48, SD 5.06) were significantly 
lower than scores for the 6/10 group (M 31.22, SD 3.42, p=.004), the 
8/10 group (M 31.52, SD 2.99, p = .001) and the 10/10 group (M 
30.52, SD 4.05, p=.039). None of the criteria groups were 
significantly different from the others. In order to test the notion that 
providing participants with information on any criterion would 
facilitate significant improvements in performance over participants 
who were not given any information about the criterion, a separate 
ANOVA was calculated.  This ANOVA revealed a significant main 
effect: F (1,157) =17.377, p<.000. Figure 1 below shows the 
differences among the five experimental groups. 
Figure 1.  Complete Falsification Scores by Experimental Condition 
 
  
European Scientific Journal   June 2014  edition vol.10, No.17   ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
 
25 
2. For the second dependent variable, each of the 9 problems (retired 
problem excluded) received a pass = 1, fail = 0 score.  On each 
problem a participant was awarded one point for answering with a 
complete falsification (selecting the p card, not selecting the not-p 
card, not selecting the q card, and selecting the not-q card).  Hence 
each participant’s score ranged from 0-9. A one-way ANOVA, 
testing for significant differences between the control group and each 
of the four criteria groups, found a significant main effect: F (4,154) 
= 4.550, p = .002. Posthoc analyses revealed that scores for the 
control group (M 4.30, SD 2.51) were significantly lower than scores 
for the 6/10 group (M 6.34, SD 1.84, p=.003), and the 8/10 group (M 
6.26, SD 1.91, p = .005). None of the criterion groups were 
significantly different from the others. In order to test the notion that 
providing participants with information on any criterion elicited 
significant improvements in performance over participants who were 
given no information about the criterion, a separate ANOVA was 
calculated.  This ANOVA revealed a significant main effect: F 
(1,157) =15.787, p<.000. Figure 2 below shows the differences 
among the five experimental groups. 








3. The third dependent variable was similar to the second except that 
each participant received a score of 1 if the participant provided a 
complete falsification solution to at least 6 of the 10 problems. A 
one-way ANOVA, testing for significant differences between the 
control group and each of the four criteria groups, found a significant 
effect: F (4,154) = 3.065, p = .018. Posthoc analyses revealed that 
scores for the control group (M .33, SD .48) were significantly lower 
than scores for the 6/10 group (M .69, SD .47, p=.037), and the 8/10 
group (M .68, SD .48, p = .050). None of the criterion groups were 
significantly different from the others. In order to test the notion that 
providing participants with information on any criterion elicited 
significant improvements in performance over participants who were 
not given any information about the criterion, a separate ANOVA 
was calculated.  This ANOVA revealed a significant effect: F (1,157) 
=10.220, p=002. Figure 3 below provides a picture of the differences 
among the five experimental groups. 
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These three set of analyses confirm the hypothesis of an inverted-U 
shaped pattern. Compared to the control group, the criteria groups scored 
significantly higher, with the criteria groups in the middle (6/10 and 8/10) 
demonstrating the highest scores on the three dependent variables.  
  The next goal was to analyze the differences in responses to the AC 
problems compared to the CA problems, and to also examine the degree to 
which the experimental manipulation facilitated solutions on those two types 
of problems. For all of these analyses, the dependent variable for complete 
falsification scores (ranging from 0-9) was used, since there was no interest 
in any response pattern except for the p, not-q selection. In order to avoid 
comparisons between six AC problems and three CA problems a composite 
score for the three CA problems was created and compared the CA 
composite score to composite scores representing every combination of three 
of the six AC problems, creating 20 triplets for use in the analysis. In table 3 
the mean and standard deviation for the 20 AC triplets and 3 CA problems 
are displayed along with the results of the pairwise analyses. 
Table 3.  Composite Score Comparisons for AC and CA Problems 
Average Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
CA 0.96 1.185 0.094 
AC1 2.45 0.869 0.069 
AC2 2.35 0.842 0.067 
AC3 2.36 0.838 0.066 
AC4 2.33 0.875 0.069 
AC5 2.49 0.856 0.068 
AC6 2.51 0.818 0.065 
AC7 2.47 0.848 0.067 
AC8 2.41 0.858 0.068 
AC9 2.37 0.925 0.073 
AC10 2.39 0.885 0.07 
AC11 2.3 0.919 0.073 
AC12 2.32 0.937 0.074 
AC13 2.28 0.942 0.075 
AC14 2.22 0.952 0.076 
AC15 2.18 0.993 0.079 
AC16 2.2 1.005 0.08 
AC17 2.36 0.931 0.074 
AC18 2.33 0.965 0.076 
AC19 2.35 0.948 0.075 
AC20 2.25 1.054 0.084 
N=159, All comparisons between each AC triplet and the CA triplet were significant at p< 
.000 




Every comparison between AC problems and CA problems was 
significant at p<.000. In order to evaluate the impact of the experimental 
manipulation on falsification scores, one-way ANOVAs were calculated for 
the CA composite score and a composite score of the 6 AC problems. The 
ANOVA for the CA problems was not significant: F (4,154) = 1.353, 
p=.253. The ANOVA for the AC problems was significant at F (4,154) = 
5.180, p=.001.  Post-HOC analyses revealed that scores for the control group 
(M 3.73, SD 1.97) were significantly lower than scores for the 6/10 group (M 
5.13, SD 1.36, p=.037), and the 8/10 group (M 5.32, SD 1.08, p = .050). 
None of the criterion groups was significantly different than the others. The 
same inverted-U pattern was seen for AC problems as is presented above for 
the overall problem set. The pattern was not replicated for the CA problems.   
Next, we calculated the correct solution means for each of the four 
argument forms (Modus Ponens-selecting the P card, Denial of Antecedent-
not selecting the not-P card, Affirmation of Consequent-not selecting the Q 
card, Modus Tollens-selecting the not-Q card) were calculated.  To evaluate 
the performance on argument forms, a pairwise samples test was computed, 
between the selection of each of the four argument forms on the three CA 
problems and each of the 20 AC triplets, using the number of correct answers 
to each argument form as the dependent measure. None of the 20 
comparisons for Modus Ponens were significant, indicating that the Modus 
Ponens argument form is not affected by problem type.  Of the 20 
comparisons for Denial of Antecedent, 11 were significant, with the CA 
problems being more difficult in every case. Of the 20 comparisons for 
Affirmation of Consequent, 100% were significant at p<.000.  The average 
score for CA problems was 1.23 out of 3 while the average scores for AC 
problems was 2.66.  Similarly, of the 20 comparisons for Modus Tollens, 
100% were significant at p<.000. The average score for CA problems was 
1.53 while the average score for AC problems was 2.71.  
In order to test the effect of the experimental manipulation on the 
correct selection of each of the four argument forms, one-way ANOVAs 
were calculated for the four CA composite scores (one for each argument 
form) and the four composite scores of the 6 AC problems. The following 
significant comparisons were found: 1) The ANOVA for the affirmation of 
consequent on the AC composite score: F (4,154) =4.160, p=.003. Posthoc 
comparisons showed that participants in the control condition (M 4.88, SD 
1.45) scored significantly lower than participants in the 8/10 condition (M 
5.71, SD .69, p=.027).  
2) The ANOVA for Modus Tollens on the AC composite score: F 
(4,154) =3.767, p=.006. Posthoc comparisons showed that participants in the 
control condition (M 4.94, SD 1.37) scored significantly lower than 
participants in the 8/10 condition (M 5.87, SD .43, p=.005).  
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3) The ANOVA for the denial of antecedent on the CA composite 
score: F (4,154) =4.222, p=.003. Posthoc comparisons showed that 
participants in the 6/10 condition (M 2.22, SD 1.13) scored significantly 
lower than participants in the 4/10 condition (M 2.88, SD .49, p = .006), the 
8/10 condition (M 2.77, SD .62, p=.036) and the 10/10 condition (M 2.81, 
SD .48, p = .021).  
4.) The ANOVA for the Modus Tollens on the CA composite score: 
F (4,154) =3.405, p=.011. Posthoc comparisons showed that participants in 
the control condition (M 1.03, SD 1.10) scored significantly lower than 
participants in the 6/10 condition (M 2.06, SD 1.16, p=.007).  
The patterns of card selection for each problem were also examined. 
There were 16 possible selection combinations for each problem. Although 
each of the 16 possible combinations occurred at least once, reasonably large 
frequencies were found only for the logically correct P, not-Q  (67.08%); the 
P and Q  (15.63%); the P (3.15%); and the P, Q, and not-Q  (3.73%) 
selection combinations. The proportions of selection frequencies of these 4 
combinations account for 89.59% of the total responding. The P and Q 
selection combination was chosen more often for the CA problems (39.30%), 
compared to the AC problems (3.79%) 
In order to avoid comparisons between 6 AC problems and 3 CA 
problems, a composite score for the selection of the P, Q strategy on the 3 
CA problems was created and compared the CA composite score to 
composite scores representing the selection of the P, Q strategy for every 
combination of 3 of the six AC problems, creating 20 triplets for use in the 
analysis. Every comparison between AC problems and CA problems was 
significant at p<.000. Out of a possible 3 points, the average number of 
selections of the P, Q strategy for AC problems was 0.0142, while for CA 
problems the average was .843.  In order to evaluate the impact of the 
experimental manipulation on the selection of the P, Q strategy, one-way 
ANOVAs were calculated for the CA composite score and a composite score 
of the 6 AC problems. The ANOVA for the CA problems was not significant 





           One goal of this study was to investigate the impact of realistic 
expectations on an academic task. The results confirmed the main 
hypothesis, that knowledge of progressively increasing success criteria 
would produce an inverted-U shaped curve for correct problem solutions. In 
short, these results indicate that students can be motivated to attempt 
academic work when they know what is expected of them, especially when 




those expectations are realistic. It was attempted here to help evaluate 
whether or not knowledge of criteria can remove cognitive or motivational 
obstacles to the display of deductive reasoning competence.  
As discussed above, it has been theorized that all adults possess the 
ability to use deductive reasoning. This study attempted to experimentally 
investigate practices professors can use to help students achieve their full 
potential. Educational intervention can take a long time to investigate. This 
task may be a way to examine the effectiveness of educational practices in a 
much shorter time frame. If knowledge of realistic criteria can improve 
performance on this task, future research on the use of criteria and 
expectations to elicit improved understanding and effort on the part of 
students can be suggested. 
 In general, this study fits in with a host of experiments underway in 
this Psychology department, which seek to provide experimental evidence of 
best teaching and assessment practices, as they pertain to students at one 
Historically Black College/University. An exciting prospect that this study 
suggests for the future of educational experimentation is that the selection 
task can be used to pilot interventions in a short period of time, in order to 
discover the potential of the researchers’ hypotheses, before they are 
implemented on a larger scale.  
The second goal of this study was to offer further support of the 
findings from Muller, Overton and Reene’s (2001) study of AC and CA 
problems, and the differential success rates they elicit. Inspection of card 
selections across problems demonstrates that AC problems were more likely 
to lead to a correct search for counterexamples (not-Q). On AC problems, 
participants were also less likely to select the irrelevant Q card than on CA 
problems. On CA problems, a common error consisted of selecting the Q 
card, and in failing to select the not-Q card. The ability to produce alternate 
antecedents that are meaningfully related to the consequent has been 
identified as a prerequisite for the correct solution to the Affirmation of the 
Consequent invalid argument form (Markovits, 1993). In the selection task, 
this solution entails not choosing the Q card.  Better performance on the AC 
problems than on the CA problems for the Q card may have been a result of 
the semantic format of the consequent terms involved in the rules and 
presented as cards. The specific character of the consequent terms may 
involve different levels of cognitive complexity and may pose different 
cognitive processing demands. Although the construction of alternative 
examples of P and Q for concrete problems may require only class inclusion 
reasoning (Kuhn, 1977; Piaget, 1974/1980), the construction of alternate 
examples of P and Q models for problems with a binary consequent 
(Barouillet and Lecas, 1998) or for more abstract problems may require the 
construction of a broader scope of negation (Byrnes, 1988; Piaget and 
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Garcia, 1991), increased flexibility in dividing and integrating logical 
classes, and the ability to generate multiple possibilities (Markovits, 1993). 
A second explanation is that the relative ease of not choosing the Q 
card in AC as compared to CA problems may be due to the semantic relation 
between antecedent and consequent. A major problem in solving conditional 
reasoning problems consists of the ability to realize that an asymmetric 
relation holds between antecedent and consequent (i.e., if P then Q, but if Q 
then not necessarily P; see Staudenmayer and Bourne, 1977). Now, in AC 
problems, the consequent-clause is a precondition for the action or event 
mentioned in the antecedent. Thus, an AC problem states a relation of 
conditionship and can be translated as “Q is the necessary condition for P” 
(see Matalon, 1990) or “P only if Q” (Thompson, 1995, Experiment 1). The 
explicit statement of the precondition relation highlights the asymmetric 
nature of the relation between antecedent and consequent: Satisfying Q is 
only a necessary, but not sufficient condition, for the occurrence of P. By 
contrast, in the CA schema, the particular temporal relation between 
antecedent and consequent does not suggest an asymmetric relation between 
antecedent and consequent; adults are also unlikely to rephrase an obligation 
as “P only if Q” (Thompson, 1995, Experiment 1). These explanations for 
correctly not selecting the Q card are not necessarily mutually exclusive. 
Rather, the semantic format of the consequent term may facilitate the 
construction of an asymmetrical relation between antecedent and consequent. 
The relative contributions of the semantic format of the consequent term and 
of the semantic relation between antecedent and consequent to the 
suppression of the Q card could be examined by systematically controlling 
for the semantic format in AC and CA problems. 
Now turn to the question of why the selection of the not-Q card is 
more difficult in AC than in CA problems. Note that the Modus Tollens 
inference is more difficult in the selection task than in the evaluation task. 
Whereas in the evaluation task participants are explicitly asked about the 
state of affairs that holds when Q does not occur, in the selection task 
participants must spontaneously discover the relevance of the not-Q card 
(Thompson, 1995). It is suggested that the relative ease of correctly selecting 
the not-Q card in AC as compared to CA problems is due to the semantic 
structure between antecedent and consequent. The semantic structure 
between antecedent and consequent in AC problems is such that it suggests 
that a necessary condition is not fulfilled (Matalon, 1990). As a result, 
participants do not have to construct the relevance of the not-Q card 
inferentially; rather, its relevance is established by the semantic relation 
between antecedent and consequent. This contrasts with CA problems in 
which the temporal relation between antecedent and consequent makes it 
more difficult to realize that the occurrence of the consequent is a necessary 




condition for the occurrence of the antecedent. As a consequence, the 
construction of the relevance of the not-Q card may require more complex 
logical operations. In particular, it may require the comprehension of the law 
of duality, which states that the complement class of a superordinate class is 
smaller than the complement class of a subordinate class (Inhelder and 
Piaget, 1958). For example, the class of things that are not birds is smaller 
than the class of things that are not eagles. It is likely that understanding the 
law of duality is required for choosing the not-Q card because participants 
must recognize that if the antecedent (P) is included in the consequent (Q) 
then the complement of the including class (not-Q) cannot be included in the 
complement of the included class (not-P).  
Recommendations for future research include the continued use of 
the selection task to investigate educational interventions. There is also are 
interest in studies which would apply item analyses to the ten problems, in 
order to potentially rework the measure to include items which can provide 
more reliable and valid results vis-à-vis logical competence and the real-time 
obstacles to exhibiting that competence. 
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